


THE COLONEL ROBERT D. HEINL, JR.  
1983 MEMORIAL AWARD  
IN MARINE CORPS HISTORY

*Texts of the Winning Article and Those  
Receiving Honorable Mentions*



History and Museums Division  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps  
Washington, D.C.

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## Previous Heint Awards

### 1981 HEINT AWARD

"Ouster of a Commandant"

*U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1980

Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC

### 1981 HONORABLE MENTIONS

"The U.S. Marine Corps; Strategy for the Future"

*Naval Review*, 1980

Lieutenant Colonel William M. Krulak, USMCR

"Political Perceptions of the Marine Forces: Great Britain, 1699, 1739, and the United States, 1798, 1804"

*Military Affairs*, December 1980

Dr. Alfred J. Marini

"Chosin Reservoir Remembered"

*Marine Corps Gazette*, December 1980

First Lieutenant Joseph R. Owens, USMC (Ret)

"Peleliu, A Neglected Battle"

*Marine Corps Gazette* (in three parts), November 1979, December 1979, January 1980

Dr. Eugene B. Sledge

### 1982 HEINT AWARD

"Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps' Sea-Going Mission"

*Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1981

Jack Shulimson and Dr. Graham A. Cosmas

### 1982 HONORABLE MENTIONS

"Land the Landing Force Where It Will Do the Most Good: A New Look at an Old Mission"

*Naval Review*, 1981

Colonel John J. Grace, USMC (Ret)

"Lejeune of the Naval Service"

*U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1981

Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr., USMC (Ret)

"Two Jima"

*American Heritage*, June/July 1981

Alvin M. Josephy, Jr.

"New Research Could Alter Aces List"

*Fortitudine*, Summer 1981

Dr. Frank J. Olynik

# Preface

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This pamphlet reprints with permission of the original publishers the article which won the 1983 Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr. Memorial Award in Marine Corps History and those which gained honorable mentions in the competition. On the facing page of the pamphlet are listed the winners and honorable mentions of previous Heinl Awards in 1981 and 1982.

The awards jury consisted of Brigadier General Frederick P. Henderson, USMC (Ret), Mr. J. Robert Moskin, and Colonel Allan R. Millett, USMCR. All are charter members of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, the presenter of the awards. General Henderson, since retirement after a distinguished Marine Corps career, has pursued an equally distinguished career as a military analyst. Mr. Moskin, former foreign editor of *Look* magazine and presently senior editor with Aspen Institute, is the author of the highly regarded *The U.S. Marine Corps Story* as well as other books. Colonel Millett is a professor of history at Ohio State University and, in addition to numerous academic publications, is the author of the acclaimed institutional history of the Marine Corps, *Semper Fidelis*.

This award is an annual one given for the best article pertinent to Marine Corps history published in a given year. The award commemorates Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., the distinguished Marine Corps officer, journalist, and historian who died in May 1979. Probably the best known of his many published works is his history of the Marine Corps, *Soldiers of the Sea*. He was a founder of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. An appreciation of his life and work, previously published in *Fortitudine, Newsletter of the Marine Corps Historical Program* (Summer 1979), has been added to this pamphlet.

The winner of the 1983 award, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Mattingly, USMC, received a bronzed plaque and a check for \$1,000 from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert H. Barrow. Honorable mention plaques were given to Captain Richard S. Moore, USMC, and to Mrs. Alice Williams, the widow of Brigadier General Robert H. Williams, USMC (Ret), who died in February 1983.

The Heinl Award was made possible by gifts to the Marine Corps Historical Foundation for that purpose. Continuation of the award program is dependent upon further donations to the fund. Persons desiring to contribute should write to the Heinl Memorial Award Fund, Marine Corps Historical Foundation, Building 58, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 20374.



E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret)  
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums



# Table of Contents

---

Previous Heint Awards.....	ii
Preface.....	iii

## *1983 HEINL AWARD*

### **"Who Knew Not Fear"**

*Studies in Intelligence*, Summer 1982

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Mattingly, USMC.....	1
---	---

## *1983 HONORABLE MENTIONS*

### **"Ideas and Directions: Building Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine"**

*Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1982

Captain Richard S. Moore, USMC.....	15
-------------------------------------	----

### **"Those Controversial Boards"**

*Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1982

Brigadier General Robert H. Williams, USMC (Ret).....	26
---	----


## *APPENDIX*

### **Tribute to Colonel Heint**

"Director's Page," *Fortitudine*, Summer 1979

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret).....	33
---	----





## 1983 HEINL AWARD WINNER

“Who Knew Not Fear”

*Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Mattingly, USMC*

As published in *Studies in Intelligence*, Summer 1982

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## Who Knew Not Fear\*

Robert E. Mattingly

In southeastern France lies a rugged region called the *Haute Savoie*. Today the area is largely known for the imposing Cathedral of Notre Dame at Grenoble and the chic ski resort of Val d'Isere. But during the long dark night of German occupation, Frenchmen came to the *Haute Savoie* not to pray or ski, but to fight. There, on a high plateau surrounded by mountains, a melancholy drama was played out during 1943-44.

Vercors plateau is 30 miles long and about 12 miles wide. A foreboding natural fortress, 3,000 feet above sea level, it is covered by one of the largest forests in all France. On its windswept top live 5,000 farmers and a few of Western Europe's last surviving wild bear.

Vercors was of special interest to General de Gaulle as well as the clandestine warfare planners of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), for in addition to the bears, 3,000 Free French *Maquisards* were lying low there. "A vast plan was being worked out to turn Vercors into a redoubt against which enemy attacks would beat in vain and which, by its example, would summon the entire Alpine resistance to the colours. From it raiding parties would descend into the plain and it would perhaps even form a corner of liberated France, the 'Vercors Republic'."<sup>1</sup>

Contracting and arming this group would be difficult but it was deemed a vital task. Special men were required and SOE decided to form an inter-allied team: British, French, and American. The mission was to be called UNION. The job of organizing it fell to SOE's 'Section RF' headed by Sir Colin Gubbins, the real "M" \*\* of British secret operations.

RF was located in London's Dorset Street near the offices of Free France at Dorset and Wigmore. It was there that the three men chosen for UNION assembled. The British member was H. H. A. Thackwaite, a pre-war schoolmaster who had become a clandestine warrior by way of St. Paul's and Corpus Christi, Oxford. As radio operator, the French-supplied "Monnier" was one of the best in the business. The American was Marine Captain Peter J. Ortiz, last seen in North Africa. It was to be a "first team" effort in point of quality as well as chronology.

UNION had a singular task: determine the military capabilities of *maquis* units reported active in Savoie, Isere, and Drome. Its *ordre de mission* emphasized that the leaders of such units should be impressed with the fact that "organization for guerrilla warfare activity, especially after D-Day, is now their more important duty."<sup>2</sup>

\* Excerpted from *Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger: Marines of the OSS*.

\*\* James Bond aficionados will recognize the fictional "M" as 007's boss.

On the moonless night of 6 January 1944, five months before OVERLORD, a Briton, a Frenchman, and a US Marine jumped from a RAF bomber in their own personal invasion of Fortress Europe.

The members of UNION followed the standard SOE practice of parachuting in civilian clothes. This time however, each carried his military uniform. Once they linked up with the *maquis* reception committee at the drop zone, Thackwaite made it clear that they were military men on a military mission. The small band thus became "the first Allied officers to appear in uniform in France since 1940." In this regard, Thackwaite was later to write: "Ortiz, who knew not fear, did not hesitate to wear his U.S. Marine captain's uniform in town and country alike; this cheered the French but alerted the Germans, and the mission was constantly on the move."<sup>3</sup>

UNION found several large groups of *maquisards* itching to fight; however, only about 500 had weapons and it would take considerable time to arrange for clandestine arms drops and training. Thackwaite, Ortiz, and Monnier took their time, maintaining a running contact with London by radio.


It might reasonably be supposed that the team remained hidden in the high country, but this was not the case. Ortiz in particular was fond of going straight into the German-occupied towns. On one occasion, he strolled into a cafe dressed in a long cape. Several Germans were drinking and cursing the *maquis*. One mentioned the fate which would befall the "filthy American swine" when he was caught. This proved a great mistake. Captain Ortiz threw back the cape revealing his Marine uniform. In each hand he held a .45 automatic. When the shooting stopped, there were fewer Nazis to plan his capture and Ortiz was gone into the night.<sup>4</sup>

When he was not emptying bars and training partisans, Captain Ortiz displayed yet another remarkable talent—stealing Gestapo vehicles from local motor pools. The citation from King George VI which made him a member of the Most Honourable Order of the British Empire reads in part:

"For four months this officer assisted in the organization of the *maquis* in a most difficult department, where members were in constant danger of attack . . . he ran great risks in looking after four RAF officers who had been brought down in the neighborhood, and accompanied them to the Spanish border. In the course of his efforts to obtain the release of these officers, he raided a German military garage and took ten Gestapo motors which he used frequently . . . he procured a Gestapo pass for his own use in spite of the fact that he was well known to the enemy. . . ."<sup>5</sup>

UNION found an extremely confused situation in its operational area. "Lack of transportation and money were serious problems and security at the regional and departmental levels was poor. UNION used its influence to coordinate several resistance organizations with divergent political views and loyalties. The *maquis* threat to German occupation forces grew proportionately."<sup>6</sup> Clashes became more frequent as the resistance forces appeared in areas formerly thought safe by the Nazis.

# SOUTHEASTERN FRANCE 1944-45



Despite the winter weather, three Panzer Grenadier battalions attacked Vercors in February, 1944. The French, ill-equipped though they were, fought back with such skill and determination that the Germans eventually were forced to employ two full divisions in sealing off the plateau.

While the *maquisards* were brave, they lacked not only heavy weapons but also blankets, field equipment, mess gear, uniforms, ammunition, and radios. They could fight hit-and-run actions but their increasingly defensive posture did not bode well for long term survival.

In late May, UNION was withdrawn by Lysander utility aircraft. Within two weeks however, two new missions—JUSTINE and EUCALYPTUS—were dropped into the same area.

### German Countermeasures

By July a general mobilization of all Vercors was in progress and so were German countermeasures. As the French well knew, these would be heavy. La Chapelle en Vercors was heavily bombed on 12 and 13 July. The following day to celebrate France's greatest national holiday, Bastille Day, American B-17's parachuted nearly 1,500 canisters of arms and ammunition into the fields near Vassieux.

"The inhabitants ran out in the streets shouting and waving to the fliers as the Fortresses circled over the roofs. Thirty minutes later the Germans began bombing and strafing the town. This continued from morning to evening and prevented the men from collecting the containers. Only at night was it possible to gather 200 of them. The Germans also started the destruction of La Chapelle en Vercors. The town was ablaze and fighters machine-gunned people endeavoring to save their belongings from their homes."<sup>7</sup>

On 19 July, the Germans launched a glider-borne assault directly into Vassieux. Two companies of Waffen SS seized the town and held it against four violent *maquis* counterattacks. During the bitter fighting, the SS lost nearly 60 percent of their strength but the French, lacking artillery, could not dig the survivors out of the town, which was almost completely destroyed. Those civilians who had not fled were rounded up by German relief forces and executed on the spot.

Thus, while the Allies were breaking out of the Normandy beachhead, in the *Haute Savoie* action was going largely in favor of the occupation forces. It was into this deteriorating situation that Ortiz' second UNION mission parachuted.

UNION II was one of a new type OSS mission: the Operational Group. OG's were heavily armed contingents whose mission was direct action against the Germans. The most militarized of OSS units, their jobs involved not only sabotage but also seizing key installations to prevent the retreating Germans from destroying them. Members always operated in uniform.

UNION II took off from Knettershall Airfield in England aboard B-17's of the USAAF's 388th Heavy Bomb Group. With Ortiz, who was carrying one

## *Who Knew Not Fear*

million francs for the resistance, were Air Corps Captain John Coolidge, Gunnery Sergeant Robert La Salle, and Sergeants Charles Perry, John Bodnar, Fred Brunner, and Jack Risler, all US Marines. Another member of the mission was a Free French officer, Joseph Arcelin (codename Jo-Jo), who carried false papers identifying him as Sergeant George Andrews, US Marine Corps Reserve.<sup>8</sup>

The mission began badly. It was a daylight drop into a good zone near the town of Beaufort, but despite ideal conditions tragedy struck the team at once. Sergeant Perry's steel parachute cable snapped six inches from the drogue. UNION II, jumped with British-style chutes—backpacks with no reserve. Perry was dead on the drop zone.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the men of UNION II, the 388th dropped 864 containers to the French "Bulle Battalion" which was operating in the Col d'Arecle. While the supplies were being gathered, Ortiz and Captain Bulle began working out plans to attack German security forces in hopes of taking some pressure from the Vercors.

During the next week, UNION II was busy instructing the members of the Bulle Battalion on the functioning and maintenance of the weapons which had been parachuted to them. Then they began a series of patrols designed to link up with other resistance groups believed to be operating around Beaufort.

"On 14 August we proceeded to Beaufort where we made contact with other F. F. I.\* companies and from there went on to Montgirod where we were told there were heavy concentrations of Germans. We were able to enter the town but had no sooner done so than we were heavily shelled by German batteries located in the hills around the city. We were forced to retire and hid out in the mountains near Montgirod with the Bulle Battalion. The Germans quickly surrounded the area."<sup>10</sup>

As soon as the mission left Montgirod, German security forces entered the town. They found two wounded *maquisards* in the parish church, shot them, and burned the building to the ground. Then they took hostages.

Meanwhile, UNION II came under heavy fire and was forced to retreat deeper into the hills. The Germans cleverly maneuvered Ortiz and his men into an unfamiliar area of steep ravines and blind canyons. By mid-day UNION was surrounded.

Ortiz had been in tight spots before and, after conferring with Coolidge, Bulle, and F.F.I. Captain Escande, he decided to make an attempt at sneaking through the German cordon. As the sun sank below the surrounding mountain peaks, the trapped party crawled past the enemy and got cleanly away.

Crossing the Isere River at Centron, the party moved along the wooded southeast slope of the Isere Valley and by the next morning was well hidden in rocky ground about a thousand meters from the small village of Longefoy. Leaving Coolidge in charge, Major Ortiz set out on another one man reconnaissance mission.

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\* *Forces Francaises de l'Interieur.*

Carefully working his way into the village, Ortiz noted there were no Germans about. Feeling a bit more at ease, he next learned that Operation ANVIL—the invasion of Southern France—had begun and that German forces had passed through earlier heading northeast toward Aime.

“I contacted the Mayor and requested food; he was understandably nervous at first, but as his confidence returned he and others became very hospitable. Food and drink were brought to us at our hideout. I found an excellent O. P. and spent much of the afternoon observing enemy movement in the valley. At nightfall, UNION entered Longefoy and was comfortably lodged by the inhabitants.”<sup>11</sup>

It was to be the last good night’s sleep for Ortiz and several others for months to come.

### **A Risk, and Consequences**

The team was now far from its operational headquarters and everyone was anxious to return there as quickly as possible in order to coordinate operations in support of ANVIL. Ortiz explained it would be risky to move during daylight but all agreed that time was vital.

On 16 August 1944, UNION II moved slowly back across the valley, crossed the same bridge at Centron and proceeded into the town. Coming out the other side, disaster struck.

As the group ascended a ramp leading to the main highway, a German convoy roared round the corner. Spotting the Americans, who were armed and uniformed, the German trucks screeched to a halt and soldiers tumbled out firing. Brunner later recalled:

“Major Ortiz, Sergeant Bodnar and Sergeant Risler withdrew into the southwest section of the town; Major Coolidge, ‘Jo-Jo’ and I took the southeast. We retaliated as best we could, working our way under fire toward the east. I called out to ‘Jo-Jo’ to follow us but he remained in the town. At this time Captain Coolidge received a bullet in the right leg but he kept going. By then we had reached the bank of the Isere, I dived in and swam across under fire. I had some difficulty as the current was very swift. It was then that I became separated from Coolidge and did not see him again until we met at the Col d’Arecle on 18 August.”<sup>12</sup>

Ortiz, Risler, and Bodnar were receiving the bulk of the German attention. As they retreated from house to house, French civilians implored them to give up in order to avoid reprisals. Ortiz ordered the two sergeants to get out while they could but neither would go without him. As the enemy fire increased, Ortiz remembered the hostages from Montgirod and the massacre at Vassieux.

“Since the activities of Mission Union and its previous work were well known to the Gestapo, there was no reason to hope that we would be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. For me personally the decision to surrender was not too difficult. I had been involved in dangerous

## ***Who Knew Not Fear***

activities for many years and was mentally prepared for my number to turn up. Sergeant Bodnar was next to me and I explained the situation to him and what I intended to do. He looked me in the eye and replied, 'Major, we are Marines, what you think is right goes for me too'." <sup>13</sup>

Ortiz began shouting to the enemy. He tried English, French, and German, but the fire did not slacken. Finally a brief lull developed and he yelled again, saying he was coming out. As he stepped into the street, an old Frenchwoman, ran to him and tried to cover his body with her own. Disengaging himself from this human shield, he walked calmly toward the German lines, machine gun bullets kicking up dust around him. Finally the firing ceased.

The German commander was suspicious but agreed to Ortiz' proposal that his men would surrender if the townspeople were not harmed. When only two more Marines emerged, however, the enemy major became agitated and demanded to know where the rest of the company was. It took a half-hour's search before the Germans were satisfied that three men had been holding off an entire battalion.

Bodnar and Risler were quickly disarmed but before they could say much, Ortiz called them to attention and directed that they give no information other than that required by the Geneva Convention. This greatly impressed the Germans, who began treating them all with marked respect. A few hours later, Arcelin was caught in a nearby field.

The four prisoners were taken to the main enemy headquarters at Bourg St. Maurice. Ortiz told his men to claim they were paratroopers from the ANVIL operation and that Arcelin should hold to the story that he was a US Marine of French ancestry. This ruse worked well, despite the fact that "Jo-Jo" could not speak a word of English.

Later in the afternoon, while being transferred to Moutiers, Ortiz worked his cigarette lighter from his pocket and tried to set the back seat of the staff car on fire, hoping to escape in the resulting confusion. The attempt succeeded only in infuriating the Germans and ruining some velour. But it was a portent of things to come.

At the *Kommandantur*, Ortiz was searched and relieved of his identification card, some papers, and 35,000 francs. He managed to conceal another 65,000 francs, however, and demanded loudly to be treated with the same respect due a German field grade officer. Soon he met Major Kolb, his new guardian, who was tasked with delivering the prize catch to Albertville. Progress on the road was slow. The enemy now so feared the *maquis* that a company of motorcycle troops was employed to escort Ortiz' car. Ortiz was pleased to note that the little column stopped at every possible ambush site and sent out patrols.

Kolb, a veteran soldier who had won the Iron Cross in both World Wars, treated Ortiz like an indulgent father.

"He quickly proved that he knew a great deal about me. In great detail and accurately he described our air operation, the burial

ceremony for Sergeant Perry, various engagements and the manner and position of our movements since leaving Montgirod. These, he said, had been reported by a shepherd who was one of his field agents.”<sup>14</sup>

The *maquis* of the Savoie had learned the lesson of Vercors well. The task of the guerrilla is to delay, to disorganize, and to panic, not to defend in place. As Ortiz and the rest of UNION were moved progressively eastward, they had the satisfaction of watching their captors struggle with a succession of ambushes. It took the 157th Division three full days to move 40 miles through an area which it allegedly controlled.

### Presumptuous Prisoner

On one occasion, Ortiz found himself in a small village which the retreating troops were systematically looting. Townspeople, seeing him surrounded by German officers and wearing an unfamiliar uniform, ignored his captors and begged *him* to discipline the unruly soldiers.

On 21 August, Ortiz was in Chambéry. Sensing that the situation was becoming increasingly critical, he asked for an opportunity to see the local commanding general. Surprisingly the request was granted and the Marine major marched in, saluted, and proposed that the 157th surrender to UNION! Unfortunately, General Flaum was not about to do any such thing. At least it has been worth a try.

By early September, Ortiz, Bodnar, Risler, and Arcelin were in the northern Italian city of Bessoleno. Here they received their first really professional search.

“They examined every body hair, every orifice, and found the 65,000 francs I had concealed as well as my map and compass. On or about 3 September, Germans escorted us to the *Kommandantur* and locked us in an office for a few minutes while the guards were being detailed to take us to Torino. I rapidly searched the office and pocketed several useful maps.”<sup>15</sup>

At Turin (Torino), the members of UNION were thrown into a stinking civilian prison which already housed 25 US Army officers and men from a chemical battalion. After a week in this pesthole, the entire group was moved to a German POW transit camp near Manjova. On the way, Ortiz tried to persuade the Army officers to join him in rushing the guards and commandeering the bus. They turned him down flat, saying that the war was almost over and it was not worth the risk.

From Manjova, the journey continued by rail. The POW's now numbered several hundred—British, French and Americans—most of whom had been captured in Italy. Crammed into boxcars of the famous French *40 hommes/8 chevaux* variety, the prisoners began a three-day trip to southern Germany via the Brenner Pass. On the way, Ortiz attempted to escape by twisting open a barbed wire barrier rigged along the boxcar's sliding door. He had almost completed his task when the train unexpectedly stopped and an alert guard found his handiwork. For that, the major received a beating and promises of future “special” treatment.



## **Who Knew Not Fear**

Finally, on 29 September, Ortiz and the other members of UNION reached their final stop: the Naval POW camp Marlag/Milag Nord located in the small German village of Westertimke outside Bremen. Happily, this was one of the best *Stalags* in all of Germany. Except for periodic searches and thrice daily roll calls, the Germans were content to merely guard their guests.

Marlag O, the officers camp, contained about 400 men. Counting Ortiz, three were Americans. The senior Allied officer was a Royal Navy captain who made it plain to the new arrival that escapes were out. Ortiz promptly proclaimed himself 'senior American POW' and announced he would set his own rules. On 18 December 1944, he made his first try, accompanied by Navy Lieutenant (jg) Hiram Harris.

Ortiz spent more than an hour cutting away at a series of wire fences and managed to reach an open field beyond the camp. Harris, however, was caught by a patrol and the alarm sounded. Searchlights picked up Ortiz. He and Harris were kicked around a bit before being thrown into solitary confinement. Since getting caught was nothing new for Ortiz, he merely bided his time waiting for the right moment to try again.

## **Adventures of Lieutenant Taylor**

By February 1945, the small American contingent at Westertimke had grown. One new arrival was just the sort of man to work with Ortiz: Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor, USMCR.

Taylor had participated in OSS operations in Corsica. In August 1944, he joined the Strategic Services Section attached to the US 7th Army for ANVIL. He reported to the headquarters of the 36th "Texas" Division along with Army Captain Justine L. Greene, a noted New York psychiatrist, and Corporal James S. Sweeney, USMC.

The 36th was the right flank division in General Alexander Patch's drive northward. Greene, Taylor, and Sweeney were directed to determine the extent of German defenses near Grasse, an area which had been bypassed.

Leaving the American lines, the reconnaissance party drove to Mons, an ideal observation post perched on a hill about twenty miles from Grasse. There they were welcomed by the local *maquis* who offered to provide an agent for infiltration of the German-held city.<sup>16</sup>

The next day, Taylor and a Frenchman drove out of Mons in a liberated Citroen. The plan was simple. Taylor would take the agent as far as the last *maquis* outpost, drop him there, and await his return.

"The agent had been leading the resistance fighting ever since our landing and was absolutely exhausted, falling asleep time and time again while I briefed him. . . I headed for the town of Saint Cezaire, which was declared to be in the hands of the Resistance. However, during the night what evidently was a company of Germans had taken up positions in Saint Cezaire. On approaching the dead-still town by a steep and winding road, we ran into a roadblock of land mines; we both thought it was the Resistance and the agent took my

carbine and jumped out of the car to walk toward the lines of mines. He lasted just about 10 feet beyond the car and died with a bullet through the head.”<sup>17</sup>

Taylor still thought it might be a trigger-happy *maquis* ambush but then he spotted what appeared to be a German forage cap. Backing up as fast as he could, the lieutenant slammed into the roadside coping. Rifle fire began perforating the Citroen.

Just as Taylor reached for the right door handle, a German leaped from a nearby ditch and flipped a potato masher grenade under the car. It blasted Taylor out into the road unconscious. When he came too, he was looking up at the stony faces of his ambushers. Grenade fragments had chopped up his left leg and mangled his left hand.

After being strafed by American planes during the trip, Taylor and his escort arrived in Grasse. On the way, the lieutenant managed to shred an incriminating document and stuff it behind the car seat. At Grasse, Taylor was “subjected to intensive interrogation which ended when he vomited on the uniform of his inquisitor.”<sup>18</sup>

During the same period that Ortiz and the members of UNION were being shunted about, Taylor experienced a similar odyssey. He passed through six different hospitals before reaching the medical prison at Freising near Munich. A month later Taylor was shifted to Moosberg. In January, 1945 his wounds were considered sufficiently healed to allow confinement at Marlag Nord.

Despite the pleas of some of their fellow POW's, both Taylor and Ortiz were perversely impenitent. They immediately began planning another escape attempt.

### Air Raid Opportunity

With Allied forces drawing closer each day, the pair began collecting civilian clothes, maps, food, and other items which they could obtain through the well organized black market system operating in and around the camp. But suddenly, on 10 April, the commandant ordered all prisoners to prepare to move within three hours. Their destination was the port city of Lubeck, a journey of at least eight days on foot.

The column left with such haste that many POW's were simply left behind. Ortiz, however, was singled out for special observation and his plan to hide in Westertimke was foiled. About three hours after leaving Marlag Nord, opportunity beckoned in the form of marauding RAF Spitfires.

As the planes roared in low to shoot up the motley mass streaming north, Ortiz, Taylor, Air Corps Lieutenant Donald McNaughton, and Royal Marines Warrant Officer Stancombe made for a nearby wood. Panic reigned. The four escapees worked themselves deeper into the trees and waited. As the aircraft disappeared, the column moved on, leaving them behind unnoticed.

Ortiz expected Allied troops to pass through the region within a day or two but the progress of fighting was much slower than that.

## *Who Knew Not Fear*

"We spent ten days hiding, roving at night, blundering into enemy positions, hoping to find our way into British lines. Luck was with us. Once we were discovered but managed to get away, and several other times we narrowly escaped detection. Fortunately, most Germans seemed to have a bad cough. By the seventh night we had returned near our camp. I made a reconnaissance of Marlag O. . . There seemed to be only a token guard and prisoners of war appeared to have assumed virtual control of the compounds." <sup>19</sup>

The little band was now in bad physical shape. A combination of little food and swamp water had made McNaughton and Stancombe ill. Taylor was covered with boils and Ortiz was very weak. On the tenth day, disgusted at the slow advance of the British Army, the four men decided it might be better to live in their old huts than starve to death outside. With Ortiz in the lead, they walked back into the camp. No commotion was raised by the guards and the remaining POW's gave them a rousing welcome. Among the reception committee were Arcelin, Bodnar, and Risler, all of whom had hidden when the evacuation commenced.

At last on 27 April, the battle reached Westertimke. German troops were still stoutly resisting the advance of the British 7th Guards' Armored Division and much of the small village was destroyed. Reasoning that the Allied forces would not fire on the POW camp, an SS unit parked several self-propelled guns there. The prisoners dug in. Soon the fighting was all around the compound and Arcelin was wounded by flying shrapnel.

On 29 April, Marlag Nord was liberated. Most POW's were only too happy to board trucks for the rear. Not Ortiz.

Along with Bodnar, Risler, and Taylor, he presented himself to Lieutenant Webb, a Navy radar officer who was attached to a Royal Marine commando battalion operating with the Armored Division. Ortiz later explained, "We Marines wanted to join this unit in order to bag a few more Germans before hunting season closed." <sup>20</sup> The offer was rejected by the POW repatriation officer and all went to staging areas behind the front.

Ortiz was evacuated to Brussels, where he reported to the OSS officer-in-charge and requested assignment to further combat duty. When the war ended, he was in California being briefed for a mission to Indochina.

Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN, Commander of the Twelfth Fleet, recommended Major Ortiz for a second Navy Cross. The citation reads, in part:

"On 16 August 1944, during the conduct of a special mission designed to immobilize enemy reinforcements, Major Ortiz and his team were attacked and surrounded. Disregarding the possibility of escape, which course of action would have certainly caused severe reprisals to be taken upon the villagers, Major Ortiz surrendered and the townspeople were thereby spared.

"The story of the self-sacrifice of Major Ortiz and his Marines has become a brilliant legend in that section of France where acts of

bravery were considered commonplace. Subsequently imprisoned and subjected to numerous interrogations, he divulged nothing. . .”<sup>21</sup>

In 1946, When Ortiz returned to civilian life and the film industry, he was the most decorated Marine officer to serve with OSS.

In addition to the Navy Cross with gold star, he had also received the Legion of Merit and Purple Heart from the United States. Britain had made him a member of the Military Division, Order of the British Empire. But it was France which recognized the “hero of the Haute Savoie” most prolifically. Ortiz was made a Member of the Legion of Honor and awarded the Croix de Guerre (two palms, gold star, silver star, and five citations), the Croix de Combattants, the Ouissam Alouite, and the Medaille Coloniale.

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
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## ***Who Knew Not Fear***

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## 1983 HONORABLE MENTION

“Ideas and Directions: Building Marine  
Corps Amphibious Doctrine”

*Captain Richard S. Moore, USMC*

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*The institutional and intellectual factors that led to the development of amphibious doctrine are of greater importance than the doctrine itself.*



## Ideas and Directions: Building Amphibious Doctrine

by Capt Richard S. Moore

**T**he Marine Corps, for over 50 years, has devoted the bulk of its training, organization, and doctrinal thought to developing and improving the techniques of amphibious warfare. The *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, published in 1934, established the first clearly defined amphibious doctrine and continues to be the foundation of Marine tactics. Throughout World War II, the tenets in the manual were tested in combat and revised. In the postwar decades, new technology, embodied in helicopters and improved landing vehicles, has further modified amphibious doctrine. Yet, the basic tactics established in 1934 remain substantially unchanged.

The *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* is a memorial to a relatively small group of Marine officers who, during the decades prior to World War II, dealt with and overcame complex doctrinal problems. Despite budget cuts, widespread disagreements both inside and outside the Corps over proper missions, and even threatened dissolution of the Corps itself, these officers developed a sound, efficient tactical doctrine. More importantly, they developed a process by which doctrine could be formulated and tested. This article will analyze this process. If the essential elements that enabled the Marine Corps to perfect amphibious doctrine in the interwar years can be identified, they may provide guidance to Marines faced with adjusting present day doctrine to the relentless demands of ever-changing technology and shifting missions.

Marines returning home from World War I faced many of the same dilemmas encountered by their grandsons 55 years later. New technology and concepts of modern war, thrust upon them on the Western Front, had drastically altered prewar perceptions. Tactics learned in the remote Latin American countryside during the years from 1912 to 1916 had proven ineffective against the well-equipped and well-trained German Army. Even the recently developed Advanced Base Force, with its primarily defensive mission, seemed inadequate in the context of new global strategies. Marine officers, caught between their traditional naval heritage and the experiences of modern land warfare, felt out of step with both.

Marine tactical doctrine in 1920, or what existed of a doctrine, reflected the amorphous nature of the Corps' recent past. Much of the doctrine rested on that of the Army and on the experiences of the European war. Manuals published at Forts Benning and Leavenworth extolled the virtues of fire superiority. Infantry remained king, although now backed by a host of artillery pieces. New weapons such as tanks and aircraft, while of obvious importance, were mere auxiliaries. Naval coloring to this doctrine emanated from the *Landing Force Manual*. This manual set down organization and rudimentary tactics necessary for a force of Marines and Navy bluejackets to motor their way to a beach (hopefully unopposed). Once ashore, the landing force was expected to quickly dispatch whatever natives had the temerity to offer resistance and get on with the

diplomatic mission at hand.

Into this general organizational and doctrinal confusion strode a newly appointed Commandant, MajGen John A. Lejeune. He was determined to rebuild the Marine Corps. Lejeune's career eminently qualified him for the task. Prior to World War I he had played an integral part in the formation of the Advanced Base Force, commanding units that ranged from the 1903 "floating battalion" to the brigade that landed at Vera Cruz. In between, he graduated from the Army War College. From 1915 to 1917 Lejeune served as assistant to the Commandant, where he learned the intricacies of Washington political life. Following several months as commander of the Overseas Depot at Quantico in 1917, Lejeune sailed for Europe. In France, he had successively commanded an Army infantry brigade, the 4th Marine Brigade, and, finally, the 2d Infantry Division. On his return to the United States, he assumed command of the new Marine training center at Quantico, the Marine Corps Schools. MajGen Lejeune, by early 1921, had fused his experiences into firm beliefs concerning the future course of the Marine Corps.

The new Commandant's ideas centered on an intense desire to instill in Marines a sense of purpose. This sense of purpose could only be achieved through establishing an important mission, backed by an educational and training system ensuring that each Marine possessed a minimum level of professional competence. Throughout his tenure, which lasted nine years, the Commandant repeatedly stressed,

both to Marines and to the Nation, the importance of a militarily efficient Marine Corps. The foundation of his program lay with the newly created Expeditionary Force, based at Quantico, whose efficiency, training, and doctrine would be ensured by the Marine Corps Schools and the Division of Operations and Training.

The Expeditionary Force, a direct descendant of the Advanced Base Force, was considered by the new Commandant as "the heart of the Marine Corps." First suggested by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1920, its primary mission, and that of the Corps, concentrated on providing the Navy with an immediately deployable landing force. The mission of the force differed from its primarily defensive predecessor, for within a capability to react immediately rested an implied ability to conduct an opposed landing. Marine planners recognized this subtle change. Maj Earl H. Ellis, a brilliant strategist even if behaviorally erratic, postulated in 1921 that, in the event of a Pacific War, Marines would have to seize heavily fortified islands from Japanese defenders. The Expeditionary Force designed to carry out this task consisted of two brigades. The 4th Marine Brigade, the main combat power of the force, contained infantry. Supporting units, such as artillery, engineers, signal, and technical troops, as well as heavy advanced base assets, formed the 3d Brigade. Although personnel shortages prevented these two brigades from ever attaining full strength, they remained for many years the focal point of Marine Corps activity.

*BGen Butler's Quantico-based Marines take a break from maneuvers to talk with Civil War veterans at the Wilderness battleground.*




Photo courtesy C.N. Bhumann



The concept of a landing force ready to deploy on short notice attracted opposition, both military and civilian. The Gallipoli fiasco in 1915 had steeled much military opinion, a significant proportion of it Marine, against amphibious operations. In 1921, Army schools proclaimed that opposed landings offered little prospect of success. Unopposed landings could easily be conducted by Army troops without any special preparation. This being the case, continued a number of Marines, the Latin American interventions still provided the real mission of the Corps, one that required priority of scarce personnel assets. In addition, the prospect of maintaining a force of questionable utility did not appeal to the budget conscious Congressmen in Washington. In his first appearance before the House Committee on Appropriations, Lejeune found himself fighting a lively skirmish with hostile politicians, at times testily defending his concept of a force-in-readiness. He refused to alter his position.

The Marine Corps Schools, collocated at Quantico with the Expeditionary Force, provided the means for Lejeune to achieve his second aim, ensuring that all Marine officers possessed a sound professional education. The Commandant, an Army War College graduate, firmly believed in the benefits of military education. Eventually, he hoped to graduate every younger Marine officer from the schools before they received promotions to the next higher rank, while he sent the older officers to higher level courses at the Army and Navy War Colleges. Only in this manner could Marine Corps officers achieve unity of thought. The curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools consisted of two courses, the Company Officer's Course, teaching company and battalion level tactics, and the Field Officer's Course, instructing staff techniques at the battalion and regimental level. Both courses, taught primarily by veterans of the AEF, disseminated Army doctrine, using texts and problems largely borrowed from the Army's infantry and staff schools. As the Marine Corps Schools matured after 1921, the two courses placed increasing emphasis on adapting Army doctrine to Marine requirements.


To coordinate Marine Corps training and education, Lejeune created the Division of Operations and Training at Marine Headquarters in Washington. Part of the Commandant's executive staff, the division closely interacted with the two organizations at Quantico. The division's education branch supervised the curricula of the Company and Field Of-

ficer's Courses, often directing the students and faculty to examine new ideas. Many of these ideas then were tested by the Expeditionary Force, whose operations and training also came under the division's purview. The Marine Corps entered the 1920s with a rejuvenated sense of purpose and an educational and operational triad to guide its development.

Almost immediately, the Marines at Quantico, under the direction of flamboyant BGen Smedley Darlington Butler, launched the first of a series of annual maneuvers that, in addition to meeting training and developmental requirements, became masterpieces of public relations and showmanship. In September 1921, the Expeditionary Force, set out from Quantico for the Civil War battleground of the Wilderness. The long column included infantrymen, tractor-drawn field artillery, anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and heavy base defense artillery. Early on 29 September, closely supervised by umpires from the schools, infantry assaulted an enemy held beach (delineated by a small stream), supported by artillery and machineguns. Once established "ashore," the Marines quickly constructed advanced base defenses. Two days later, while President Harding and a host of dignitaries, including the Secretary of the Navy and the Chairman of House Naval Affairs Committee, watched, the Expeditionary Force conducted several attacks incorporating, in addition to ground tactics, a series of aviation exhibitions.

For the next three years, the Expeditionary Force maneuvers were an annual social and military event. The 1922 exercise took place at Gettysburg, again observed by President Harding, whose entourage included Gen John H. Pershing and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The pattern repeated itself in 1923 at New Market, Va., and in 1924 at Antietam, Md. Long columns of Marines converged on their objectives, closely watched by political and military dignitaries, a multitude of critical Civil War veterans, and interested civilians. After carefully reenacting the Civil War action, the Marines wheeled into their own conception of how the battle would be fought with modern weapons, sometimes, as at Antietam, delighting the onlooking crowd with an occasional aerial or tank attack. By late 1924, the Marines had sold Lejeune's Expeditionary Force.

In addition to their marketing value, the maneuvers also enabled certain training and experimental goals to be met. Most obvious, the Expeditionary Force meshed together each year



*Marines unload 75mm gun from armored motor lighter during maneuvers at Culebra in 1924.*

and trained as a unit. Equally important, new entities within the force were allowed to demonstrate, and test, their roles. Since World War I, Marine aviation had been clamoring for a wider role. Proponents argued that Marine aviation should be an integral part of the Expeditionary Force, citing its value not only as a reconnaissance asset, but also as a ground support bombing weapon. At the Wilderness, Marine pilots had their debut. Flying 180 sorties, including day and night bombing attacks, they greatly impressed observers. Succeeding exercises expanded the role of aviation so that by 1924 aircraft were carrying out extensive experimentation specifically scheduled into the maneuvers. Tank tactics received similar attention during the maneuvers, culminating at Antietam, with an independent armored attack, which moved freely without any mobility constraints from accompanying infantry. More significant, students from the Marine Corps Schools participated in the maneuvers as umpires and members of the Expeditionary Force staff. In these capacities they applied recently learned Army principles to unique Marine Corps problems. The practice of using the students began in 1921 as a training device to supplement classroom work and evolved during the next three years into an experimental vehicle for testing new concepts. The annual exercises substantially improved Marine readiness while keeping the public fully aware of the Corps' capabilities.

Marine Corps training and testing during the early 1920s did not confine itself to the dusty battlefields of an earlier war. In 1922, two companies from Quantico practiced embarkation and debarkation of troops and heavy equipment, including 155mm guns, at Culebra. Two years later, the Expeditionary Force, reduced by personnel shortages to an infantry regiment and a defense regiment, carried out landings at Panama and Culebra as part of Fleet Problem 4. The Panama phase of the exercise confined itself to a traditional advanced base operation. At Culebra, however, the infantry regiment as-


saulted beaches occupied by their defensively oriented comrades. The ensuing fiasco included lost boats, ineffective gunfire, and troops stranded along the beaches. Two newly designed landing craft proved unwieldy, as did a gangly amphibious tractor designed by Walter Christie. The Marines involved, however, learned valuable lessons in this early doctrinal groping; lessons that clearly impacted on the conduct of the following year's massive fleet problem.

Joint Army and Navy Problem 3, held in 1925, signaled a major change in Marine doctrinal thought. In addition to an Army division and the Pacific fleet, the exercise included the 4th Marine Regiment (recently designated the West Coast Expeditionary Force following its return to San Diego after four years police duty in Santo Domingo), elements of the East Coast Expeditionary Force, and the students and faculty of the Marine Corps Schools. The Marines' task involved simulating a force of 42,000 Marines—two divisions plus supporting troops—assaulting the island of Oahu. Each Marine division included infantry, artillery, tanks, engineers, and an aviation element of observation and attack planes. Officers from the Marine Corps Schools made up the various level staffs, while the troops from the 4th Marines and Quantico imitated much larger units. Detailed plans spelling out every facet of the landings from embarkation to operations ashore were written by the student/faculty staffs. The assault, carried out against Army defenders from Schofield Barracks, barely succeeded in establishing a lodgement ashore. Within a few hours, however, enough Marines had concentrated inland from the beaches to make umpires feel that defenses of the island could be seriously threatened. Although the landings displayed many of the weaknesses of earlier exercises, they did demonstrate the roots of a newly emerging doctrine.

Back at Quantico following the exercise, the officers of the Marine Corps Schools gathered to assess their experiences. In a report issued by

the Commandant of the Schools, Col Robert H. Dunlap, the officers put forward several recommendations. The report declared that while basic Army doctrine remained relevant there existed a definitive need for unique Marine Corps equipment and training. Curriculum at the Marine Corps Schools should be improved to include a progressive series of problems leading to a final month-long practical application, all geared towards landing operations, in order to adapt Army methods to Marine needs. Perhaps the most important recommendation, for it paints a clear picture of Marine thoughts on doctrinal education, called for a "School battalion" to be used for both demonstrations and practical application. Students at Quantico would use the battalion to apply, in a laboratory environment, the precepts learned in class. Additionally, the battalion could be divided into several headquarters units where students, acting as staff officers, would practice "the maneuvers involving . . . the capture, defense, and withdrawal of [an] island position."

As Lejeune's fifth year as Commandant ended, he may well have looked on the Marine Corps with a guarded sense of achievement. Through his dogged stressing of peacetime readiness, embodied in the Marine Corps Schools and the Expeditionary Force, and supervised by the Division of Operations and Training, he had created an efficient military force. New concepts had begun surfacing, and a new spirit animated many Marines, as evidenced by a growing intellectual outpouring in



*Mail robberies in 1925 interrupted peacetime maneuvers.*



*Secretary of Navy Edwin Denby with Gens Lejeune and Butler at Quantico in 1922.*

the pages of the Marine Corps GAZETTE. Yet, these accomplishments only signified changing perceptions. The Oahu fleet exercises could only be regarded as a limited success; many mistakes had been made by inexperienced officers. The Marine Corps Schools, attempting to give all Marine Corps officers a common level of professional knowledge, still taught Army doctrine using Army texts. Progress had been made, but Marines still remained distant from any new doctrine.

Five years of peacetime development abruptly succumbed to operational exigencies. A rash of domestic mail robberies in late 1925 and 1926 led to Marines guarding postal service railroad cars and trucks. In total, almost 2,500 Marines from the East and West Coast Expeditionary Forces provided mail security. Additionally, approximately 900 Marines continued to serve in Haiti's national police force, a duty undertaken by the Marine Corps since 1916. In 1927, almost every available Marine, including those recently released from safeguarding the mail, found himself in foreign territory. Responding to a rapidly deteriorating situation in Nicaragua, the 2d Marine Brigade, organized from the East Coast Expeditionary Force, established itself in the turbulent Latin American nation. Thousands of miles away, Smedley Butler, commanding the 3d Marine Brigade, whose nucleus consisted of the San Diego based 4th Marines, stepped ashore at Tientsin, China to protect U.S. interests from the devastation of a renewed civil war. Within a year, five infantry regiments backed by an equal number of aircraft squadrons, as well as



***Marines in Haiti: training under combat conditions.***

artillery, tank, and engineer units, had deployed overseas. Demands for officers reached such a critical level that the Marine Corps Schools closed in the spring of 1928, the Company Officer's Course not reconvening until September 1929. Quantico's doctrinal education and testing had been supplanted by more urgent requirements.

The brigades in Nicaragua and China took advantage of the opportunity to train and experiment under expeditionary, and often combat, conditions. The 3d Brigade, following hectic embarkation at San Diego, settled into a routine alternating between guarding the international settlements and training. Exercises integrating artillery, aircraft, tanks, and infantry maintained and sharpened professional skills. The Marines in Nicaragua received the majority of their training while chasing Sandinista guerrillas. In hundreds of small unit actions, usually involving no more than a dozen Marines, some Nicaraguan National Guardsmen, and a few pack mules, the stark realities of combat confronted the members of the 2d Brigade. Although these encounters, with a few exceptions, involved at most a large patrol and a few aircraft, they provided invaluable experience to hundreds of Marine officers, many of whom would play a major role in doctrinal development a few years later.

Marine aviation particularly benefited from the crisis in Nicaragua. On 17 July 1927 two aircraft, flying a routine scouting patrol, approached the village of Ocotal. The pilots, startled, looked down to see a major battle underway; a small garrison of Marines and National Guardsmen had retreated into their barracks while around the building swarmed hundreds of Sandinistas. Quickly returning to Managua, the aviators' report immediately

cause five bomb-laden aircraft to be dispatched. Arriving at Ocotal, they dove on the guerrillas, guided by Marines using signal panels in the besieged barracks' grounds. Dropping bombs and strafing, the five planes produced near panic in Sandino's troops, many of whom threw away their weapons and fled. An estimated 300 died. Marine aviation had carried out history's first combat dive bombing attack. During the ensuing months, the 2d Brigade's aircraft grew increasingly effective. Dive bombing attacks on the stronghold of El Chipate and on large guerrilla forces attacking Marine columns near Quilali in 1927 and 1928 improved the efficiency of aviation. Patrols came to be accompanied by armed aircraft, ready for instant retaliation in the event of an ambush. By 1929, when the 2d Brigade began withdrawing from Nicaragua, Marine aviation had earned a permanent combat role.

Not all new developments emanated from Nicaragua and China. At the Marine Corps Schools, despite personnel shortages, great strides had been taken towards articulating a separate Marine Corps doctrine. Spurred on by increased emphasis on landing operations in Navy War plans and a 1927 edict by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy declaring that the Marine Corps held responsibility for providing fleet landing forces, the schools instituted extensive curriculum changes. The Field Officer's Course, formerly devoting only two hours to landing operations, offered, in 1926, a major subcourse entitled "Overseas Operations," covering aspects of naval warfare ranging from the Washington Conference limitations on ship building to the theories of naval gunfire in support of an amphibious landing. Instead of using texts borrowed from the Army, "Overseas Operations" texts originated at Quantico. As a further illustration of the intellectual advancement at the schools, short texts appeared containing reprints of articles from the *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, the highly respected British military publication. These articles, written by such men as J.F.C. Fuller and MajGen Sir George Aston offered new ideas to the Marine students, as well as a solid historical foundation for further study. Significantly, some of the maneuver experiences from the early postwar years found their way into the new curriculum. Students were tasked with planning landing operations. A lecture entitled "Naval Gunfire" dealt, in part, with the mistakes made during the 1925 Oahu exercise. Late in 1927, the Division of Operations and Training directed that a re-

duced strength training battalion be formed at Quantico, whose functions included support of instruction at the Marine Corps Schools. In short, the Educational Center at Quantico, though hamstrung by manpower losses, continued to expand the ideas of the Marine Corps.

The Division of Operations and Training strove to ensure that all Marine officers kept abreast of the innovations and lessons being learned at Quantico and in Nicaragua and China. Through a series of articles published in the Marine Corps GAZETTE, doctrinal developments reached officers even in remote outposts. Each issue of the journal included a section entitled "Professional Notes" that detailed new ideas and changes within the Marine Corps, as well as the experiences from Nicaragua and China. The formation of the training battalion at Quantico was announced to Marines in September 1927. In 1928, the Division of Operations and Training discussed the importance of tanks, recounting the achievements of the light tank platoon in China to support its argument. Three months later, the "Professional Notes" included a series of combat after-action reports from Nicaragua, which elaborated the important achievements of aviation. These articles and many others disseminated new doctrinal developments, helping the Corps to reach Lejeune's educational goals.

The low priority of the Marine Corps Schools rapidly changed in 1929 in response to two events. First, the disbanding of the 2d and 3d Brigades, released officers to return to the Education Center. The Company Officer's Course reopened; enrollment in the Field Officer's Course increased. Officers with newly acquired combat and expeditionary experience assumed posts as instructors. Second, and of much greater consequence, Col J.C. Breckinridge was appointed commandant of the schools. Although he would remain at Quantico for only a year (to return again in 1932), the new director of Marine officer education instilled a sense of intellectual urgency in the faculty and students at Quantico.

Breckinridge brought to the Marine Corps Schools fierce convictions concerning the proper role of military education. Abhorring rote memorization of maxims and principles, he sought to encourage analytical thinking by students. Facts existed only to form a common base of knowledge. He envisioned military education as providing a sequence of progressive intellectual steps beginning with basic con-

cepts taught to newly commissioned lieutenants. Proceeding to the Company Officer's Course, officers would be confronted with problems that required more than regurgitation of data. The next step, the Field Officer's Course, began a series of applicatory exercises designed to force officers to analyze and solve complex military problems. As a final link in this educational chain, Breckinridge hoped to open a War Planning Course aimed at challenging older officers by requiring them to develop strategic plans without directives to guide their work. Breckinridge's goal through all this was, as he stated, "to cultivate curiosity, encourage investigation, stimulate discussion, and inspire criticism that will result in improvement."



*MajGen Fuller was a member of the Guantanamo society that founded MCA.*

Officers reporting to the Marine Corps Schools in 1930 encountered an intellectual beehive. In addition to changes in the Field Officer's Course, emphasis on landing operations had extended to the Company Officer's Course. The Allied failure at Gallipoli attracted increased attention from students and faculty. Texts and map problems emphasized historical and hypothetical analysis of the operation. Naval gunfire, always an unknown variable in an amphibious landing, received particular scrutiny. Under Breckinridge's guidance, answers to tactical questions, instead of being promulgated, were arrived at through investigative reasoning. Students soon examined amphibious operations ranging from the Chilean Revolution of 1891 through the Russo-Japanese War to Germany's seizure of the Baltic Islands in 1917. As one Marine later exclaimed, "they looked at everything with a question mark."

Although Breckinridge left Quantico after only a year, his sense of urgency continued.

MajGen Ben H. Fuller, appointed to head the Corps in 1930 when Wendell C. Neville died after only a year as Commandant, had been a close associate of Lejeune. A member of the original Guantanamo society that founded the Marine Corps Association\*, he firmly supported the developments begun in 1921; indeed, he faced a similar situation. Budget slashes dictated by the Depression threatened the Marine Corps with large cutbacks. As had become almost an historical certainty, threats of cutbacks engendered new questioning of Marine roles and missions. With the contingencies of the late twenties greatly reduced (although some Marines remained in Nicaragua until 1932 and the 4th Marines would remain in China through 1941), Quantico again assumed critical importance. To emphasize this fact, the Commandant upgraded the billet of commandant of the Marine Corps Schools from colonel to brigadier general.



**Maj C.D. Barrett**  
produced the first  
manual for landing  
operations.

Fuller, recognizing the need for a clearly stated doctrine, directed the Marine Corps Schools to produce a manual for landing operations. A board, headed by Maj Charles D. Barrett, an instructor at the Field Officer's Course, convened. Included on the board, known as the Landing Operations Text Board, were Majs Lyle Miller and Pedro del Valle and Navy Lt Walter C. Ansel, an instructor in naval gunfire support. Proceeding slowly, the board

\* In 1911 a group of officers at Guantanamo Bay, bothered by what they saw as a lack of foresight and professionalism, founded the association. Three future Commandants were among its initial members: Fuller, John A. Lejeune, and George C. Barnett. Their goal was to promote discussion and free debate among Marine officers. Five years after its founding, it had accumulated enough money to begin publishing a professional journal, the Marine Corps GAZETTE.

conducted exhaustive historical research, attempting to assimilate past lessons. In 1931, under the co-authorship of Barrett and del Valle, concrete results emerged in the form of a treatise entitled, appropriately, *Landing Operations*. Although still not a statement of doctrine, the paper brought the Marine Corps much closer to the Commandant's goal and would serve as a basis for further examination.

Barrett's concepts were subjected to some practical experimentation during 1932. A battalion of infantry, reinforced by an artillery battery, participating in joint Army and Navy exercises off Hawaii, found that, unless all Services adhered to the same tenets, the pages of a Quantico treatise became worthless. As in earlier fleet maneuvers, cooperation between Marines and sailors proved difficult. Coordination among naval gunfire, air support, and assault troops was almost nonexistent, with each arm establishing its own priorities. While disappointing, the 1932 maneuvers highlighted the need for a comprehensive doctrine.

As Barrett and his committee continued its deliberations, the intellectual pace at Quantico significantly increased upon reappointment in April 1932 of BGen J.C. Breckinridge as commandant of the Marine Corps Schools. Since 1929, the Marine educator had expanded his ideas. His concept of progressive military education, containing the same school steps outlined in 1929, aimed at building an officer into a "Statesman Soldier," a Marine who, although a military man, fully comprehended the broad political framework into which armed force fit. To achieve this goal, the Marine Corps required a firm doctrine built from a common understanding of mental processes and allowing for continual readjustment of tactical and strategic principles. Doctrine, according to Breckinridge, rested on a "unity of comprehension" which implied intellectual dynamism.

Intellectual dynamism could only be achieved by instilling into each Marine officer a sense of skepticism. Breckinridge believed three key professional attributes were necessary: originality, initiative, and openmindedness. The Marine Corps Schools offered Breckinridge and his newly appointed assistant, Col E.B. Miller (who shared his commander's views) the vehicle with which to inculcate officers with the necessary mental skills. Words such as "teach" and "examination" became taboo at Quantico, as they implied a requirement for rote memorization. Tactical principles became "guides," tools to be used or ignored by problem-solving students. Through a series of



essays, written by Breckinridge and handed out to students, the director of education hoped to encourage open debate. Additionally, he directed Army texts still in use at Quantico to be discarded and replaced by new, Marine oriented texts. At the bottom of these innovations lay Breckinridge's hatred of blind adherence to precedent.

As Breckinridge set about revamping the Marine Corps Schools, pressure for a concrete doctrine grew more pronounced. Responding to fiscal constraints, the Secretary of the Navy established a board to investigate possibilities of money-saving consolidations within the Navy Department. The possibilities to be investigated included amalgamating the Marine Corps into the Navy, in essence, eliminating the Corps. Exhaustive hearings began, calling on testimony from Marine and Navy officers, not all of which was favorable to the Corps. The General Board, however, responded with a clear statement entitled "Functions of the Marine Corps in National Defense," attacking any attempts to disband the Corps. Citing Marine efficiency and training, the paper dismissed ideas that the Army could assume a landing force mission. A keystone of the argument rested on historical Marine-Navy cooperation, describing failures of combined operations with the Army. Indeed, the four-page essay devoted three and a half pages to contrasting Marine capabilities against Army weaknesses in regard to landing operations. Given the renewed threat to the Marine Corps, with only a nebulous treatise entitled *Landing Operations* to show for what the General Board described as "150 years of close association and service with the Navy," the need for a better expression of the emerging Marine doctrine seemed imperative.

Late in the year, after urging by the Commandant, Breckinridge closed the Schools and directed that a landing operations manual be written. To supervise the writing, and to edit the final draft, he appointed Maj Dewitt Peck. Peck quite possibly knew more about amphibious operations than any other Marine officer. As an instructor at the Naval War College, he had used the college's library to study over 250 landing operations conducted throughout history. Each became the subject of a card kept in a reference file. Using this file and the results of three years of study by Barrett and the Marine Corps Schools, as well as recently compiled student and instructor outlines, several committees convened to flesh out a draft outline approved by a board of officers from

Quantico, the Fleet Marine Force,\* and the Division of Operations and Training. Development proceeded rapidly. One seminar, headed by Peck and responsible for developing landing tactics, reflected Breckinridge's intellectual emphasis. After each member researched a particular topic, ideas would be written on a blackboard, scrutinized, and left overnight. The next morning, additional changes would be made and the concept incorporated into the manual. Within six months, the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, following final editing by Peck, was a reality.

The new manual, a concise statement of Marine Corps amphibious doctrine, underwent evaluation and practical testing throughout the rest of the decade. At the Marine Corps Schools, it served as a text for the 1934-35 academic year, where students subjected it to detailed examination. Each year, from 1935 to 1941, Marine units took part in Fleet Landing Exercises, specifically designed as doctrinal tests in addition to providing valuable training. The Division of Operations and Training, through a liaison officer posted at Quantico, kept pace with any recommended changes and inserted ideas from Washington. Yet, *FM 31-5*, the official Army copy adopted in 1940, reflected very few changes from the original 1934 draft.

The manual that enabled American forces to successfully assault Guadalcanal in 1942 and countless other islands during the following three years represented over 20 years of systematic development. Beginning in 1921, in the forests of the Wilderness and progressing through the surf at Oahu and Culebra into the classrooms at Quantico, Marines had been devoting much of their intellectual energies to developing a tactical amphibious doctrine. While, at times, they appeared to be groping, particularly in the early 1920s, they continued to approach the problem empirically. The question, however, remains: why were Marines able to develop a singularly effective doctrine in an era when competing operational and institutional priorities should have fragmented their attention?

The reason for the successful doctrinal development of the Marine Corps prior to 1935 is embodied in three key factors: a clearly defined sense of direction, a solid organization that maintained that sense, and widespread intellectual stimulation. In 1921, MajGen John

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\* Partially in response to the 1933 pressure, the Expeditionary Force had been redesignated the Fleet Marine Force, with expanded landing force duties, in December.

A. Lejeune, had stepped in to end nearly 20 years of uncertainty. He clearly stated that the main function of the Marine Corps lay in providing a ready expeditionary force for service with the Navy. This being the case, declared Lejeune, Marines must be trained and educated into a truly efficient military force, capable of conducting amphibious operations. For nine years, despite operational commitments that dispersed assets and attention, the Commandant adamantly maintained his stand that the

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*Extract From the Hearing Before the House Committee  
On Appropriations, February 12, 1929*

MR. FRENCH: There is one observation I would like to make: At the time, Mr. Chairman, when General Lejeune was before our sub-committee a few weeks ago, we were not aware that he would not be with us the coming year, although we knew his immediate detail was coming to an end. I just want to say this for the Record: That he has been the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps for the entire period of six years that I have been Chairman of the Naval Appropriations Sub-Committee, and during that period he has won the absolute confidence of the members of that committee. He has done that through his intense earnestness, his untiring zeal, his fine integrity, and his most wonderful efficiency. As he leaves this detail for another under the Marine Corps, he carries with him the sincere respect, good will, and heartiest good wishes of every member of the committee, as I am sure he does of the membership of our entire Appropriations Committee, as we have come to know him as an officer and as a man.

MR. WOOD: So say we all, General.

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primary duty rested with the fleet. The direction provided by Lejeune was reinforced by the ever-present threats to the existence of the Marine Corps. Manifested by budget and personnel cuts and, in 1933, the Navy Department hearings, the specter of organizational dissolution added urgency to the Commandant's ideas.

To implement his ideas, Lejeune established the organizational machinery necessary to allow methodical planning, experimentation, analysis, and promulgation of doctrine. The Marine Corps Schools and the Expeditionary Force (later the FMF) at Quantico, and the Division of Operations and Training formed a triangle in which ideas became doctrine. The Division of Operations and Training ensured that the activities at Quantico conformed with the ideas of the Commandant, and that each Marine received at least a minimum level of training and education. The Marine Corps

Schools conceived and promulgated ideas, establishing a common educational and doctrinal bond among officers. The Expeditionary Force provided a practical testing ground for newly learned, or developed, concepts. Together, these three units served as an avenue, through which the Commandant maintained the direction of the Marine Corps. More than that, however, these elements became an empirical vehicle, whereby ideas could be conceived, tested, analyzed and, ultimately, developed into definitive doctrine.


Command direction and sound organization, however invaluable, constituted static entities, unable of themselves to produce results; intellectual flexibility instilled a dynamic quality to Marine Corps doctrinal development. At Quantico and in the pages of the Marine Corps GAZETTE in the early 1920s, Marines began to voice their ideas. Muted, but not eliminated, by the necessity to bring all Marines up to a common level of experience following the war, these ideas budded in the late twenties, as landing operations drew increased attention at the Marine Corps Schools. In 1929, Col Breckinridge removed all constraints. Marine officers, allowed to run intellectually rampant, attacked the problems of landing operations. Barrett, del Valle, and later Peck, offer excellent examples of the type of inquisitive, searching officers Breckinridge hoped to produce. Through them, and many others, the complexities of amphibious operations were subjected to exhaustive research and analysis. Doctrine assumed a dynamic quality. The lasting applicability of the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* can be attributed to Breckinridge's determination to instill in every Marine officer inquisitiveness and flexibility of thought.

While Marine Corps tactical amphibious doctrine continues to be a notable contribution to the military art, the institutional and intellectual factors that led to its development are of considerably greater importance. For any military organization to remain doctrinally sound, it must be capable of questioning established principles and of synthesizing new ideas. When that ability is lost, the military force becomes a stagnant dinosaur, ready to be destroyed. The Marine Corps, in the years preceding World War II, developed a dynamism that resulted in a singularly effective and flexible doctrine. The lessons of that doctrine lie not in its tactics, the details of which are applicable only to a specific historical era, but in the institutional and intellectual forces from which it was created.

USMC







## 1983 HONORABLE MENTION

### “Those Controversial Boards”

*Brigadier General Robert H. Williams, USMC (Ret)*

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# Those Controversial Boards

by BGen R. H. Williams, USMC(Ret)

*When the war to make the world safe for democracy ended, another fight began—in the tradition-locked corridors of Headquarters Marine Corps.*



*Major General Commandant George Barnett*

**I**n the spring of 1919 Headquarters Marine Corps moved from the Walker-Johnson Building on New York Avenue to the new Navy Building on the Mall, fronting on Constitution Avenue between 17th and 19th Streets N.W. George Barnett was the Major General Commandant. The immediate task facing him was demobilization, and it came less than a year after Congress had authorized a wartime strength of 75,000—a figure not quite reached when the war to make the world safe for democracy ended on 11 November 1918.

A more formidable task, however, also confronted Gen Barnett. This was the reconstitution of a postwar corps of regular officers. Prewar authorized enlisted strength had been 17,400. Authorized commissioned strength was 4 percent of this, or nearly 700, but the Corps had nowhere near that number of officers when war was declared on 6 April 1917. There had not been time enough to commission second lieutenants to fill all the vacancies resulting from the increase in enlisted strength authorized by the National Defense Act of 1916.

The immediate need for hundreds of second lieutenants was met in two ways: (1) by giving temporary commissions to meritorious non-commissioned officers (thereby weakening the backbone of the Corps at the outset of expansion), and (2) by offering either permanent or Reserve commissions to graduates of military colleges and to university graduates having some military experience. Many of the latter category opted for a Reserve commission because they were anxious to get into uniform. It took several weeks to process a permanent commission, whereas a second lieutenant of the Marine Corps Reserve could be sworn in on the day he appeared before a naval examining board for brief physical and oral examinations.

After war was declared, so many university graduates and undergraduates enlisted in the Marine Corps that Headquarters adopted a policy of commissioning second lieutenants only from the ranks. Those chosen received temporary commissions after completing the course at the officers' training camp at Quantico or in the case of the 4th Brigade, an Army officers' training camp in France. During 1917, however, more than 200 second lieutenants were permanently commissioned. Although their subsequent promotions were temporary, as were those of all regular officers, the fact that they possessed permanent commissions as second lieutenants was to pose a problem.



*Col John H. Russell believed promotions should go only to "officers and gentlemen."*

The Naval Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1920 (passed in July 1919) provided tentatively for an increase in authorized enlisted strength from the prewar 17,400 to 27,400. This meant an authorized officer strength of nearly 1,100. There were actually more vacancies in the commissioned ranks than there were officers holding permanent commissions.

To reduce enlisted strength was not difficult. It soon reached a low of barely 15,000. Nor was it difficult to reduce officer strength. Reservists could be returned to inactive status and temporary commissions revoked at any time, but to select those to be retained and permanently commissioned presented problems with which two commandants and two selection boards wrestled from the armistice until the spring of 1921.

When war was declared, there were only a few more than 400 regular officers and a few Inactive Reserve lieutenants. Commissioned strength of all categories peaked at 2,130 soon after the armistice. What remained of the prewar regular officer corps, after normal attrition and losses in France, formed a solid block from the Commandant on down to include the top 100 of the 329 captains authorized in the postwar Corps.

Gen Barnett, the first Commandant to be appointed for a specified period, had been reappointed when his four year term expired in February 1918. In a circular letter published in January 1919 he invited all officers serving in temporary or Reserve status to apply for a permanent commission. In that same month he

recommended to the Secretary of the Navy that a board of officers be convened with Col John H. Russell as president to select the officers to be retained.

Col Russell was said to have advised the members of the board to bear in mind that they were selecting the young officers whom they would invite into their quarters and whom their daughters might marry. This could be interpreted to mean that young men of education and good family background as well as excellent service records—in the terminology of the day, officers and gentlemen—should be given preference over former enlisted men, especially the prewar NCOs with little formal education.

The Russell Board reported its findings in August 1919. It recommended those officers to be retained in their present temporary rank, those to be retained but with lower commissioned rank, and those to be discharged or offered warrant or NCO rank. All commissions were to be probationary for one year.

One of the few wartime officers to be promoted to major before the war ended, Leroy P. Hunt, who had distinguished himself as a company and battalion commander in France, was placed almost at the top of the list of captains. There were others who had served in the 4th Brigade who also were retained in the rank of captain. Among them were Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., John W. Thomason, Jr., the writer, and Alfred H. Noble, but they were not generally high on the list. This was owing in part to the temporary captains who had been commissioned permanent second lieutenants in 1917 and whose seniority was not subject to rearrangement. Many temporary captains who had served in France with distinction were relegated to the list of first lieutenants. Among them were Clifton B. Cates and Graves B. Erskine. Louis Cukela, a temporary first lieutenant at war's end, headed the list of second lieutenants.


The last was not out of line, but the failure to place Cates high on the list of captains is puzzling. No Marine officer who served in France was awarded more decorations for gallantry in action, and his background was in keeping with Col Russell's announced ideas. His selection after the armistice to command the Marine company in Pershing's picked regiment and, after his return to the United States, to be one of Gen Barnett's aides as well as a White House aide attested the high opinion of him held by his superiors. In all, special recognition was undoubtedly due about 20 officers (almost all of

them college graduates) for their outstanding service in France. The board's findings did not provide this recognition.

MajGen John A. Lejeune had commanded the famous 2nd Division of the American Expeditionary Force after Soissons in July 1918. Under him BGen Wendell C. Neville had commanded the 4th Brigade of Marines which comprised half the infantry of that division. They and other senior officers who had served in France were understandably dissatisfied with the board's treatment of Cates and others, particularly of former enlisted men of the 4th Brigade who had won their commissions in France. The fact that none of the Russell Board members had served with the 4th Brigade in France aroused further suspicion and undermined the credibility of the board's actions. Also there were those who seem to have exploited this dissatisfaction for their own purposes.

In the spring of 1920 a secret scenario was put together for an ugly little drama. When staged it would humiliate Gen Barnett and enable his successor to scrap the Russell Board and redo the selection process with some new twists. To understand the circumstances surrounding the convening of the second board we must backtrack.

Secretary of the Navy Daniels appears to have played the part of dissembler. An egalitarian who scorned inherited wealth and social position, he apparently disliked Mrs. Barnett who was amply supplied with both as well with a ready wit that flashed amusingly and sometimes scathingly at the expense of pretentious politicians.



*Much decorated Louis Cukela was reduced in rank by the Russell Board.*



*President Wilson and Secretary Daniels teamed to both make and break Gen Barnett*

Before Barnett's first appointment in February 1914, Daniels had interviewed, among others considered for the post, John A. Lejeune, then the senior lieutenant colonel of the Corps. Thus far no Naval Academy graduate had ever been Commandant. During the Roosevelt and Taft years, ill feelings had developed at departmental level between the two Services. Daniels wished to restore mutual regard. Both Barnett and Lejeune had gone to the Naval Academy. Although Daniels considered the latter to be the best qualified officer in the Corps, he recommended Barnett to President Wilson on the basis of seniority.

The Secretary gave Barnett outstanding fitness reports and praised his performance of duty as Commandant in his annual reports to the President. Two weeks before Barnett's first term ended, Daniels announced his reappointment in glowing phrases. Soon afterward he presented the Commandant with the Distinguished Service Medal.

But the Secretary gave the Commandant a hint. On the day of his reappointment he asked him to sign an undated letter of resignation. Daniels believed that officers should not serve longer than four years in Washington. Although he had made exceptions of the bureau chiefs and the Commandant during the war, it was with the understanding that their reappointments might be terminated after peace was restored. Barnett objected to signing the blank resignation. The Secretary let the matter drop . . .

On 18 June 1918 while the fight for Belleau Wood was in progress, General and Mrs. Barnett were sitting in the gallery of the House of Representatives when an amendment to a naval personnel bill, increasing the rank of the Commandant to lieutenant general, came up for consideration. The amendment was expected to pass until Representative Thomas S. Butler, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, rose to speak. He blasted it unmercifully, calling attention to the presence of Gen Barnett



*Thomas Butler—"words to provoke a duel."*

in insulting terms that a century earlier might have provoked a duel. The amendment, which Daniels had not endorsed, was defeated. It would take another generation and a second World War to make the Commandant of the Marine Corps a lieutenant general.

Congressman Butler was the father of the restless and ambitious Col Smedley D. Butler, then impatiently waiting in Haiti for orders to combat duty in France which he was unlikely to receive. For years the elder Butler had been in a position to exert pressure to further his son's career. Before the year was out Smedley Butler got to France, but not to see combat.

Gen Barnett must have resisted the efforts of father and son (and probably Secretary Daniels) for several months to persuade him to order the younger Butler to France. The latter had probably used his father's influence to get to Haiti, the likeliest expeditionary post for a little action before the United States entered the war against Germany, so the Commandant let him stay there.


On 4 June 1920 the Naval Appropriations Bill passed, making permanent the hitherto tentative authorized strength of 27,400, thus firming postwar officer strength at 1,093. It also contained enabling provisions for convening a second board that so broadly defined eligibility for a permanent commission as to nullify the Russell Board. It is difficult to relate this legislation to any initiative or recommendation on the part of Gen Barnett.

From 5 May to 8 June the Commandant had been absent from Washington, inspecting posts and stations on the West Coast. Soon after

returning to his desk in the Navy Building, he must have learned from Daniels of the Secretary's intention to remove him from office. On 12 June he wrote, in his own hand and not on official stationery, a confidential letter of protest to Daniels, on the rather weak premise that he had not signed an undated letter of resignation as the bureau chiefs who were reappointed during the war had done. This letter clearly establishes that the sensational turn that events in the Navy Department would take within a week did not come as a complete surprise to Gen Barnett.

After lunch on Friday, 18 June 1920, just two years after Congressman Butler's speech on the floor of the House, a messenger entered the aide's office at Headquarters Marine Corps with a note from the Secretary to Gen Barnett. 1stLt Clifton B. Cates took it into the Commandant. The note informed him that Daniels had decided to replace him, the office to change hands the following week on whatever day would be convenient. And would the general let him know immediately whether he wished to retire as a major general, or remain on active duty as a brigadier general?

After hurried consultations with his principal staff officers and a telephone call to Mrs. Barnett, the Commandant replied that he wished to remain on active duty. He refused to resign. Daniels obtained Barnett's dismissal from President Wilson.



*Gen Lejeune replaced Barnett as CMC.*



*MajGen Neville headed new selection board.*

Since his return from Europe in 1919 Gen Lejeune had been commanding general at Quantico with BGen Smedley Butler as his chief of staff. Twelve days after the delivery of the note, on 30 June 1920, Lejeune relieved his old friend as Commandant in the presence of only the two aides. It was simpler than the relief of a sentry on post, except that when Lejeune began to sit down after entering the Commandant's office Barnett said, "John, stand up there just a minute." After reminding him of their years of friendship he asked why he had not let him know about what was going on.

"George, my hands were tied," said Lejeune.

"All right," replied Barnett. "I stand relieved. You're the Commandant." Headquarters Department of the Pacific, a contrivance, really, was established for Barnett in San Francisco whither he went, wearing one star and taking with him 1stLt Clifton B Cates, who loyally volunteered to accompany him as his aide.

Gen Lejeune, the most distinguished officer of the Corps, had been a certainty to succeed Barnett. Before the war he had been Barnett's choice for Assistant Commandant. Barnett ordered him to France, recommended him for a second star. Had it not been for Gen Lejeune's great prestige, the ouster of a serving Commandant, so foreign to Corps tradition, would have aroused tremendous criticism.

During those last days of June before the relief, Congressman Butler and his son were seen arriving several times at the 18th Street entrance to the Navy Building to go to the Secretary's office. We can conjecture that the



*BGen Harry Lee commanded 6th Marines.*

scenario called for Gen Butler to succeed Lejeune as Commandant.

When Gen Lejeune took office on 30 June 1920, he and Daniels lost no time in moving to revise the work of the Russell Board. Only three days later the Secretary signed the precept convening another board. This time MajGen Neville, just promoted, was named president. Among other members were BGens Butler and Harry Lee. The latter had commanded the 6th Regiment after the first day of Belleau Wood.

The provisions of the Act of 4 June 1920 made all officers serving under temporary or Reserve commissions in the grades of captain and below eligible to fill vacancies in the permanent authorized strength. It went further, making eligible also wartime officers who had left the Service. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy ruled that the board could rearrange the rank and order of precedence of those temporary captains who possessed permanent commissions as second lieutenants. It was his position that since the Act of 4 June 1920 stated that *all officers* who had served in the Corps during the war were eligible for consideration, preference to those with permanent commissions would be illegal.

The process of reselection dragged on for months, a time of extreme uncertainty for company officers, particularly captains retained by the Russell Board who had not fought in France. Such a company commander in Quantico or Haiti might well wonder, as he talked to a lieutenant who wore the ribbons of decorations won in France, whether he might not soon be changing places with him.

In March 1921 when report of the Neville Board was approved and published, it was apparent that the second board's approach had been simplistic. Officers who had demonstrated leadership in battle were accorded preference, regardless of education or other criteria. Of 219 selected in the grade on captain, 122 had served in the ranks; of 276 first lieutenants, 187; of 253 second lieutenants, 180.

Leroy P. Hunt was number one on the list to fill captain vacancies. (By this time there were 92 prewar regulars ahead of him, and he would not again put on the gold leaves of a major for more than 10 years.) Clifton B. Cates was number two, gaining years of seniority by moving up from number 49 on the list of first lieutenants. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., was number six. In December 1920, after more than a year in France mapping the battlefields of the 4th Brigade, he had returned to become an aide to Gen Lejeune and at the White House.

Graves B. Erskine moved up from number 18 on the list of first lieutenants to captain number 28, and Alfred H. Noble from captain number 129 to number 11. Louis Cukela jumped one complete rank, from the top of the list of second lieutenants to number one first lieutenant, tantamount to giving him a captaincy.

Except possibly for Cukela, all mentioned above were officer material under any criteria, but farther down the list of captains and among the lieutenants were many from the ranks who were either too old or without the formal education needed to be effective career officers. Despite Prohibition, some drifted into alcoholism during the long years of slow promotion that followed. Since many eligible applicants had not had an opportunity to demonstrate their leadership under fire, the overemphasis on battle experience did not seem fair, nor necessarily in the best interests of the Corps over the long term.

Gen Barnett was not without congressional support. On the day after the Harding Administration took office in March 1921, he was made a permanent major general, thus delaying Butler's promotion to that rank. Lejeune was reappointed then and again reappointed in 1925 by President Coolidge. He retired in 1929. Neville succeeded him, but was a sick man and died after a long illness in 1930. His death made MajGen Butler the senior officer of the Corps. Butler fought for appointment as Commandant, but had alienated the senior officers of the Navy. Without his father, who had died in 1928, he had no chance of winning the position. BGen Ben H. Fuller who, as Assistant,

had acted as Commandant during Gen Neville's illness, was appointed.

After leaving public life Josephus Daniels published an autobiographical account of the Wilson years. After retirement Gen Lejeune published his autobiography, and a biography of Gen Butler appeared to which he had contributed substantially in personal interviews with the author.† The silence of all three concerning events leading up to Gen Barnett's dismissal is probably significant. The changed eligibility criteria in the Act of 4 June 1920 to include those who had left the Service, the language inserted to require officers having permanent commissions as second lieutenants to compete for rank and seniority with the rest, together with the haste with which the Neville Board was convened all suggest collusion.

Perhaps some sound general conclusions with respect to the boards are possible and in order. The Russell Board virtually ignored combat records to select on a peacetime basis applicants who had served as officers only in wartime. Some had fought in France; most of them had not. The Neville Board, determined to reward battle performance, overcompensated by downgrading normal criteria for the selection of career officers to favor many who had passed the test of battle, regardless of limited education or age in grade. A proper balance between the two legitimate but often conflicting considerations seems to have eluded both boards.

It must be noted that in the end Col Russell's philosophy of selection was in some measure vindicated. During his brief tenure as Commandant in the mid-1930s, Congress finally passed legislation, which previous Commandants beginning with Gen Lejeune had urged, to replace promotion by seniority alone with a selection system. The first two such selection boards for middle-grade officers, meeting in June 1934 and in January 1935, passed over many captains considered for promotion to major and many first lieutenants considered for promotion to captain who had been selected for permanent commissions by the Neville Board. This caused their involuntary retirement. Many were simply too old, but others had demonstrated unfitness by inferior performance of duty.

USMC

† Both Gen Lejeune's autobiography, *The Reminiscences of a Marine* and Lowell Thomas' account of Butler's life, *Old Gimlet Eye* have been reprinted and are available as part of MCA's *Heritage Library Series*. See Books.





APPENDIX  
TRIBUTE TO COLONEL HEINL  
“Director’s Page”  
*Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)*

As published in *Fortitudine*, Newsletter of the Marine Corps Historical Program, Summer 1979

# Director's Page



*BGen Simmons*

Col Bob Heint and his wife Nancy were on a windjammer cruise in the schooner *Polynesia* and that morning, Saturday, 5 May 1979, they had come to St. Barthelemy in the French West Indies. About noon they went for a swim on an empty beach and Bob died in the surf of a heart attack. It was probably the kind of death that he would have chosen for himself—nearly instantaneous, hopefully painless, and at the water's edge of a foreign shore. But it came much too soon.

Thinking back over the life of Robert Debs Heint, Jr., I am struck by how closely it fits the advice his friend Samuel Eliot Morison gave young writers:

*Dream your dreams  
Aye, and write them,  
But live them first.*

Bob was born on 12 August 1916, not in Washington, D.C., as he was prone to let people think, but in New York City. His mother had gone there for specialized medical attention and he would be an only child. After birth he was brought back to the District of Columbia. His father had come to Washington in 1907, was a White House correspondent, and in 1924 would pioneer a radio news service. Bob's father built the Heint home, a handsome Georgian-styled house in the embassy section of Northwest Washington, in 1919 and it would know five generations of the family.

The "Debs" in his name was for his father's uncle Eugene Debs, the long-enduring Socialist presidential aspirant. Bob remembered vividly his great-uncle's staying with them after his release by President Harding on Christmas Day, 1921, from Atlanta penitentiary where he had been sent for pacifist activities in World War I. Bob's father, far from being a pacifist, had been chief of the publications section of the U. S. Emergency Fleet Corporation—the government agency pushing the building of ships—and in the process had become a friend of bandmaster John Philip Sousa.

Another of Bob's early, vivid memories was of be-

ing perched on his nurse Delia's shoulder to see Gen Pershing on a handsome horse leading the victory parade down Pennsylvania Avenue. This would have been in 1919 and Bob would have been barely 3 years old, but from any age his memories were always vivid, always sharply detailed, and always brightly colored.

Inevitably an Episcopalian, he was baptized and confirmed in the Bethlehem Chapel of the National Cathedral and sang in the boy's choir. He went to St. Albans School on the cathedral grounds, finishing in 1933 and, after a year at George Washington, went on to Yale. Here he majored in English and enrolled in one of the few Naval Reserve Officers Training Courses then in being. He also belonged to a Naval Reserve battalion that met in the Washington Navy Yard. A summer cruise in 1936 in the old *Idaho* qualified him evermore as a "battleship sailor." He graduated cum laude in 1937, received his commission, and went to The Basic School, then in the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Class of 1938. One of his instructors—and an officer for whom he would have a life-long admiration—was Capt Lewis B. Puller, already wearing two Navy Crosses from Nicaragua.

In May 1938, on graduation from TBS, he was assigned to the Marine detachment in the 8-inch gun cruiser USS *Tuscaloosa*. The detachment commander was Capt Donald M. Weller, destined to become the Corps' recognized expert in naval gunfire support and now a retired major general and President of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. The new lieutenant, with his round face, pink cheeks, and bright blue eyes, looked all of 16 years old. As he saluted the quarterdeck, resplendent, he thought, with his boat cloak and sword, he heard one old barnacle-encrusted bosun's mate say to another, "I saw him first." Or at least that's how Bob would tell it in later years. To age himself a bit he grew a guardsman's mustache; it would be a lifetime fixture. While serving in the *Tuscaloosa* Bob would qualify to stand officer-of-the-

deck watch underway, distinguish himself with his 5-inch battery in local control battle practice, and have his first piece published in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, "Naval Africa Expedition, 1915" (June 1938), followed by "The Naval R.O.T.C.: A Vein Unworked" (September 1938).

He came off the *Tuscaloosa* in May 1939, a firm believer in naval gunfire and with the conviction that all young Marine officers should go to sea. He was detailed to the 5th Marines, then at Quantico, and served as a company officer until November when he was transferred to the 4th Defense Battalion then forming at Parris Island. While a senior at Yale he had met Nancy Gordon Wright, originally of London, at a Washington cocktail party. In September 1939 they were married in the Bethlehem Chapel of the National Cathedral. Don Weller was the best man. There were more articles for the *Gazette*: "Cameroons Coast Campaign" (September 1939), "Hilton Head Marines" (March 1940), and "The Big Wind at Parris Island" (September 1940).

In February 1941, the 4th Defense Battalion went to Guantanamo, Bob's first Caribbean duty station. Nancy went with him and they lived in a tent. Daughter Pamela was born 10 August 1941 in the Guantanamo dispensary and Nancy nearly died of childbed fever. There were more *Gazette* articles: "Hilton Head and Port Royal, 1861" (March 1941), "'Guns or Butter?'" (September 1941), and "On the Mobility of Base Defense Artillery" (also September 1941). There were now articles for the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*: "Damage Control School" (March 1941), "Training the Landing Force" (October 1941), and "The Slouch and the Spring: A Footnote on Discipline" (December 1941).

With war clouds gathering in the Pacific, the 4th Defense Battalion was sent to Pearl Harbor in November 1941. Bob, now a captain, commanded a battery in the defense against the 7 December Japanese attack and was in the aborted expedition that was sent to relieve Wake Island. In March the battalion went forward to Efate in the New Hebrides. There was still time for writing for the *Gazette*: "Fighting and Writing: The Two 'G's'" (March 1942) and "The Future of the Defense Battalion" (September 1942).

Back in the States in December 1942, he had a year of flight training at Dallas and Pensacola. There were problems of recurrent attacks of malaria contracted in the New Hebrides and a minor aircraft accident. He did not get his wings but he would always believe the

year not wasted; that it gave him special insights into Naval Aviation. From Pensacola he went to Camp Lejeune and the 13th AAA Battalion (the defense battalions, shorn of their beach defense capability, had become anti-aircraft battalions).

In August 1944 it was time for him to go overseas again. He was destined for another base defense assignment, now very much in the backwaters of the war. He was rescued from this by the recommendation of his former commanding officer, now naval gunfire officer for V Amphibious Corps, LtCol Weller, that he be assigned to the 3d Marine Division as naval gunfire officer. The two old shipmates worked together on the pre-D-Day naval gunfire bombardment plan for Iwo Jima. His expertness not only in planning but also in directing and coordinating naval gunfire brought him a Bronze Star.

After Iwo he succeeded Weller as V Corps naval gunfire officer at Maui and, with the end of the war, again followed in his mentor's footsteps, succeeding Weller as naval gunfire officer on the staff of FMFPac on Oahu. After a dry period in 1943-44, the *Gazette* was again studded with his articles: "Iwo Dark Horse" (August 1945), "Naval Gunfire Support in Landings" (September 1945), "First Cruise Training" (December 1945), "Our Future DIs" (March 1946), "'We're Headed for Wake'" (June 1946), and "Let's Use Our Dress Uniforms" (November 1946). For the *Proceedings* there was "A Field Decontamination Station" (May 1944) and "Naval Gunfire, Scourge of the Beaches" (November 1945).

All those articles made it almost inevitable that when he returned to Washington in November 1946 he would be named head of the Historical Section, then in the Division of Information. It was the fulminating period for World War II official histories and it was Bob, now a lieutenant colonel, who conceptualized (how he would have scorned the word; he would have struck it out and substituted "conceived") the monograph series geared to the island campaigns. As he wrote in a letter to a friend in England:

"We are just getting down to execution of a historical program which will eventually culminate in preparation of an official history of the Marine Corps in this war. As a preliminary measure, we are producing a series of detailed historical monographs, to be published separately, on each major operation in which the Corps participated, and these monographs will support corresponding chapters in the final history."

From his own typewriter came three monographs: *The Defense of Wake* (1947), *Marines at Midway* (1948), and, completed later by LtCol John A. Crown,

*The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo* (1954). He also began his note-taking for a history of the Marine Corps.

I was managing editor of the *Gazette* in those days and it seemed that every mail brought us another article from LtCol Heintz, so many, in fact, that when the manuscript for "Thin Line of Tradition" (July 1947) arrived it was accompanied by the suggestion that the pseudonym "LtCol John Corbin" be used. "Corbin" went on to write "Thin Line of Tradition, II" (April 1948), but the real author appeared for "Thin Line of Tradition, III" (July 1949). Other *Gazette* articles during this prolific period were: "Minority Report on (J)ASCO" (July 1947), "Combat Historians?" (September 1947), "Rising Tide of Administration" (January 1948), "Naval Gunfire Training in the Pacific" (June 1948), "Exhume the Gunnery Sergeant" (June 1949), "How Would You Do It?" (November 1949), and "Marine Corps History—Report to the Stockholders" (March 1950).

His by-line also continued to appear in the *Proceedings*: "The Most Shot-at Island in the Pacific" (April 1947), "The U.S. Marine Corps: Author of Modern Amphibious War" (November 1947), "What Happened to the Royal Marines" (February 1949), and "Marine Corps: Here to Stay" (October 1950).

In these years he was very much mixed up in the "unification" fight that was taking place incident to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Growing up in Washington and tagging along in his father's footsteps had given him many bridges to the news media. As he wrote to a Pittsburgh newspaperman in February 1947:

"Functionally speaking, I think some degree of unification on a fair basis is desirable. I think that almost everyone with good sense wants to see coordinated procurement, non-competitive budgeting, unified intelligence operations and unified operational commands for respective theaters. These are the major stated aims of present merger legislation. . . . To me, the most objectionable aspect of the plans now bruited is that, ostensibly to facilitate achievement of several laudable ambitions, it sets up cabinet and administrative machinery which can without reference to Congress, public wishes, or even the President, make, in our military structure, vital changes which are not necessarily stated or projected on the face of the plan. . . . One of the major points at issue, which threads through the whole controversy is whether or not our national defense structure should be absolutely pyramidal, with a chain of command running down from an all-powerful secretary and military chief of staff at the top, or whether, at the very top, there should not be some latitude for the interplay of naturally differing viewpoints between the interested parties, namely, ground, sea, and air."

A second most objectionable feature of the merger plan, in his opinion, was the creation of a separate Air Force, which, while stated as being part of "unification," he found in fact divisive. In the 32 years that followed, he would never waver from these judgments.

In June 1949 he left HQMC. His next duty station would be Quantico, but before reporting in, there would be a trip with Nancy to Europe, made possible by a small inheritance from an aunt. It was his first visit to Europe; he particularly wanted to see London and all its history. He also "fell madly in love" with Paris.

At Quantico he again relieved his old friend, Col Weller, this time as Chief of the Naval Gunfire Section, Marine Corps Schools. These were the days when the Navy's ships were still plentiful in number, amply armed with guns, and there was a nice symmetry to naval gunfire support: battalions had 5-inch destroyers in direct support, regiments had 6- and 8-inch cruisers, divisions had 14- and 16-inch battleships. The years at Quantico saw the writing for the *Gazette* of "Small Wars—Vanishing Art?" (April 1950), "And Now the ANGLICO" (January 1951), "The Old Slouch Hat" (June 1952), and "Marine Corps Glossary" (November 1952). The Heintzs kept their apartment in Washington rather than taking quarters in Quantico. Son Michael was born in Washington Hospital on 3 February 1950.

Bob's turn for Korea came in October 1952. The front had settled down to a war of position. Bob was made Commanding Officer, East Coast Islands Defense Element, Wonsan. He gloried in the assignment. He was virtually an autonomous island commander and he waged almost a private artillery and naval gunfire war against the mainland North Koreans. After six months of this he had a stint as Executive Officer, 11th Marines, and for his service in Korea he received a Legion of Merit with Combat "V."

Detached from the 1st Marine Division in July 1953, he was sent to England to serve as Marine Corps Representative, Amphibious Warfare Center, Fremington. The parade of articles for the *Gazette* continued: "FSCC: Two Schools of Thought" (January 1953), "NCOs—A Challenge from Within" (November 1954), "The Case Against the Cloth Belt" (June 1955), and "Sensible Summer Uniform" (September 1955).

England was a very special tour for both Bob and Nancy. He came home in August 1955, as someone put it, "The only Royal United States Marine," and

looking more British than American with swagger stick, mustache, gloves, and non-regulation Sam Browne. He was assigned to Plans Branch, G-3 Division at Headquarters, Marine Corps, and proceeded to scandalize HQMC by having beer with his noontime sandwiches at his desk. (I was his opposite number in Plans Branch, G-4, and in a position to observe). He continued to wear high-top "fair leather" shoes of a type that had long before gone off the uniform list and a barracks cap whose individuality attracted the personal attention of the Commandant, Gen Pate. He wrote the script for the expanded pageant at the Birthday Ball. Most of the words have stuck and are still heard each 10th of November. He was one of the champions of the newly-discovered tradition of Mess Night. (See *Fortitudine*, Winter, 1978-79.)

In June 1954 the *Proceedings* had printed "The Cat with Nine Lives," the story of the Corps' unending struggle for survival, and in May 1956 it published Bob's best-known magazine piece "Special Trust and Confidence," a bitter commentary on the erosion of the status of the uniformed officer. He was promoted to colonel in September 1956. In November the *Gazette* reprinted "Special Trust and Confidence."

It was in 1956 that the U. S. Naval Institute brought out the first edition of *The Marine Corps Officer's Guide*, jointly written with Gen Gerald C. Thomas and RAdm Arthur A. Ageton. A perennial best-seller, particularly at The Basic School, the *Guide* has gone through second (1964), third (1967), and

fourth (1977) revised editions.

In spring 1957 he took "an Eighth and Eye drill platoon, the Parris Island Band, and a chunk of the Marine Corps Drum and Bugle Corps" to the Bermuda International Tattoo. In late summer the following year he repeated the performance with a similar detachment that went first to the Edinburgh Tattoo and then to the Brussels Worlds Fair in "the first appearance of Marine ceremonial troops in Europe since the Paris Exposition of 1889."

Next came Haiti: Bob went there in January 1959 to establish a naval mission and on 1 March was officially designated Chief of the U.S. Naval Mission (mostly Marines) and the Military Assistance Advisory Group. Characteristically, Bob and Nancy, both fluent in French, plunged themselves into a study of Haitian culture and history. Bob also found time to finish his history of the Marine Corps.

"The Right to Fight," a spin-off article from the projected book, was sent by the *Proceedings* in September 1961 to the Pentagon for clearance. Clearance was refused because the piece was sharply critical of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, Gen Omar Bradley, Adm Forrest Sherman, and former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, all of whom were presented as being anti-Marine and dedicated to downgrading or abolishing the Corps. Gen Shoup, then Commandant, concurred that the article should not be published.

The matter might have ended there except that about this time the Senate Armed Services Committee

*Twenty-two years after its publication, Guantanamo Marines remembered "Special Trust and Confidence" when Col Mark P. Fennessy and his officers, in January 1978, turned out to honor Col Heintz.*



was investigating charges that the Pentagon was muzzling expression of opinion by military officers and, as a case in point, suppression of the Heint article attracted national attention. Bob was summoned back from Haiti to meet with Arthur Sylvester, then the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. On 30 March 1962 the Pentagon reversed itself and released the article. "The Right to Fight" appeared in the September 1962 *Proceedings* and publication of the entire book, *Soldiers of the Sea*, followed, appropriately, on 10 November.

The dust had scarcely settled on this controversy before Bob was once again in the national news. Despite strenuous efforts as mission chief, he had been unable either to turn the clock back in Haiti or to turn around, the increasingly oppressive government of Francois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier. *Life* magazine asked him to do an article on the Haitian situation. Bob wrote a 2,000 word piece. Again there were problems getting Pentagon clearance. Meanwhile he had worn out his welcome with the Haitian government and in late February 1963 was asked to leave. He ignored the suggestion until 1 March when he was declared officially *persona non grata* and given 12 hours to get out of the country.

Days later the 8 March issue of *Life* appeared with an article "It's Hell to Live in Haiti . . . with Papa Doc." Bob, on leave in Bogota, Columbia, was called to Washington and stood before an Article 15 investigation headed by BGen Bruno A. Hochmuth. The hearing convened at 1000, 24 April at HQMC. He was asked to sign a statement indicating his willingness to accept non-judicial punishment. He refused, stating that if the findings of the investigation were adverse he would demand a general court martial.

Assistant Secretary Sylvester testified that he had killed the article personally on the recommendation of the State Department. Witnesses from *Life* said that none of the Heint material had been used in the *Life* article which had been written by two *Life* correspondents. Bob was the final witness. Testifying on 1 May, his defense was that there had been no offense; he had insisted that his article not be published until clearance had been obtained.

The Hochmuth investigation found that Bob had "failed to comply with regulations by agreeing to provide and providing a manuscript" to *Life* "without prior approval of proper authority." It was a weak charge. As Commandant, Gen Shoup ruled "that Col Heint's failure to comply with regulations was not an intentional action effected to accrue benefits to



*Port-au-Prince provides the backdrop for Col Heint who carries a traditional Haitian cocomacaque.*

himself." Shoup gave Bob a private "chewing out" and the case was closed.

Bob then proceeded to Norfolk where he was assigned as G-2, FMFLant. The promotion boards met that summer and he was passed over for brigadier general. A physical examination revealed a hitherto unsuspected heart condition. Bob submitted his letter requesting retirement, effective 1 January, at which time he would have completed 26 years and 6 months of active service. He was retired on that date with 40 percent medical disability.

Bob started off the New Year and retired life with a series of press conferences in which he suggested that the Air Force be abolished, because the "military usefulness of manned aircraft is waning," and the defense establishment be returned to two departments, Army and Navy, eliminating "the requirement for today's enormous coordinating bureaucracy" headed by "iron-handed" Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

Free to write and talk "without supervision" he embarked on a six-month campaign leveled against the regime in Haiti, as, for example, in an article for the 16 May 1964 *New Republic* in which he described Duvalier as "cruel, devious, xenophobic, hyper-suspicious, today a virtual recluse, utterly ruthless and self-consecrated to power."

There was also more time for books. His *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* was published in 1966, followed in 1968 by *Victory at High Tide*, his brilliant operational history of the Inchon landing and re-capture of Seoul.

Articles in the *Gazette* were now less frequent, but there had been "So Acquainted with Maritime Affairs" (November 1957), "Fitness Reporting—Some Adverse Remarks" (April 1959), "Hell in China" (November 1959), "An Association Was Formed"

(April 1963), "Marines and Their Traditions" (November 1964), "Inchon" (September and October 1967), and "Safari to Scotland" (November 1968). For the *Proceedings* there was "Target: Iwo" (July 1963), "The Gun Gap and How to Close It" (September 1965), and "Hong Kong: Communism and Colonialism in Collision" (December 1966).

During 1967 and 1968 he acted as a consultant on long-range gun systems for the Navy Department, working on the improved 8-inch round and the lightweight 8-inch gun and being as much or more responsible than any other single individual for getting the 16-inch battleship, USS *New Jersey*, out of mothballs and onto the gun line off Vietnam.

In mid-1968 Bob went to work for the *Detroit News* as military correspondent, succeeding the esteemed BGen S.L.A. Marshall. He also began a syndicated military column, distributed by the North American News Alliance and appearing in some 60 newspapers. In September 1968 he went out to the Far East to see the Vietnam war for himself. He had been out there once before in 1965 and would go again in 1969 and 1971.

In 1970 his *Handbook for Marine NCOs* was published. His columns, usually pungent, were being widely read. There was a series in November 1972 charging that the "permissive" policies of Adm Elmo Zumwalt had resulted in more "mutinies" than the entire previous history of the Navy. The series angered VAdm Stansfield Turner, then the president of the Naval War College. Turner called in his senior Marine and told him that he didn't want Heintz invited back as a lecturer. Bob chose to regard the ban as an "interdict" comparable to his expulsion from Haiti. Eventually, though, he "negotiated" a *modus vivendi* with Turner.

A year before this I had become the Director of Marine Corps History and Museums, a newly-created billet. One of my chief advisors on what needed to be done was Bob Heintz. I was searching for a site where the diverse and scattered activities of the new division could be consolidated. It was Bob who suggested that I look at the Guard Company Barracks in the Washington Navy Yard. That was in December 1971. Three years passed before the Guard Company moved into its new barracks and the conversion of the old building into the Marine Corps Historical Center could begin.

After the Center was opened on 12 May 1977, Bob became a regular and frequent visitor. He was also a regular reader and frequent critic of *Fortitudine*, using

the transparent *nom de plume* of "Careful Reader." In July 1978 he retired from the *Detroit News* but continued to write his column for NANA. He and Nancy had collaborated on a history of Haiti, *Written in Blood*. More definitive than anything else written on Haiti, either in English or French, it was published in the fall of 1978.

Bob's last appearance in the *Gazette* was a three-part series, "The American Occupation of Haiti" (November, December 1978; January 1979) drawn from the new book. By that time Bob, Nancy, and son Michael (who is fluent in Mandarin) were off on a memorable trip to Red China.

His last full-fledged article for the *Proceedings* was "Welcome to the War" (March 1969), a joyful report on the *New Jersey's* opening salvos off Vietnam. It was followed by a shorter piece, "Instant Sea Control Ships" (September 1972), in which he recommended the conversion of the four *Iowa* class battleships into a combination heavy naval gunfire ship, assault transport, and V/STOL aircraft and helicopter carrier.

Other magazines that used his work through the years included *American Heritage*, *American Rifleman*, *Armed Forces Journal*, *Combat Forces Journal*, *Military Affairs*, *Military Review*, *NATO's 15 Nations*, and *Sea Power*. He was particularly proud of his contributions to *Brassey's Annual*, *Dictionary of American Biography*, *Dictionary of American History*, and *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. He lectured widely, at such places as the Marine Corps schools, most of the war colleges, the Foreign Service Institute, and Yale and Brown Universities. He was also a correspondent for *Fire Engineering*, a fireman's magazine, and a short wave radio in his study and office was usually tuned-in to fire calls.

Town clubs and professional societies were very much part of his life style. In Washington he was a member and staunch supporter of the Army-Navy Club and the National Press Club; in New York, the Yale Club and the New York Yacht Club (he and Nancy kept a 27-foot Tartan sloop at Port Annapolis Marina); and in London, the American Club. He was a Fellow of Yale's Pierson College, a founder of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, and a member of the Institute of Strategic Studies, the American Military Institute, the White House Correspondents Association, and the Military Order of the Carabao.

That last Caribbean vacation was actually a footnote to a journalistic foray into Nicaragua which was then entering the final stage of its recent revolution. Bob



and Nancy had spent 10 days there as guests of then-President Anastasio Somoza and toured much of the country in a presidential helicopter. (Somoza told them that he was perfectly willing to step down if and when proper elections could be held. A Sandinista vic-

tory seemed inevitable to Bob.)

Four days after Bob's death, a memorial service filled the Bethlehem Chapel in the National Cathedral. It was done with high Episcopalian style and outside the cathedral the scarlet-coated Marine Band played.

